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INTRODUCTION
American criminal law adopted the fiction that corporations are people so it could hold them accountable for wrongdoing. 1 But it left the project notre dame law review [vol. 91:5 incomplete. Though crimes typically require an actus reus and a mens rea, 2 courts have no real theory of how corporations, which have no bodies or minds, could instantiate either. 3 The best they have is an antiquated gimmick-respondeat superior-for holding corporations vicariously responsible for the crimes of their employees. 4 That approach may have the benefit of making courts somewhat consistent in deciding when to hold corporations accountable. But even that lone virtue is now threatened as respondeat superior, at this stage in corporate history, increasingly produces outcomes at odds with any sensible notion of criminal justice. Sometimes respondeat superior lets patently criminal corporations off the hook. This could be because, in complex and opaque organizations, the paper trail may be too long and incomplete to find individuals who committed crimes attributable to the corporation. 5 Or it could be because there (June 16, 1999) , http:// www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2010/04/11/chargingcorps.PDF ("It will often be difficult to determine which individual took which action on behalf of the corporation. Lines of authority and responsibility may be shared among operating divisions or departments, and records and personnel may be spread throughout the United States or even among several countries. Where the criminal conduct continued over an extended period of time, the culpable or knowledgeable personnel may have been promoted, transferred, or fired, or they may have quit or retired."); BRANDON GARRETT, TOO BIG TO , http://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/manhattan-us-attorney-announces-criminal-charges-against-general-motors-and-deferred. To critics seeking individual liability, the prosecutor replied, "Criminal intent can be hard to prove. But if there is a case to bring, literally is no individual employee who did anything proscribed by law. For example, in one case, a ferry capsized after setting sail with her bow doors open, killing nearly 200 passengers. 6 From top to bottom, the corporation that ran the vessel "was infected with the disease of sloppiness." 7 Prosecutors brought manslaughter charges against the corporation, but no individual employee was so sloppy as to have been grossly negligent, the required mens rea. 8 Applying respondeat superior, the court found the corporation not guilty. 9 Other times, respondeat superior exposes a corporation to criminal charges despite the overwhelming sense that the true criminal is not the corporation but some rogue employee within its ranks. 10 In United States v. SunDiamond Growers of California, 11 a corporation's in-house lobbyist defrauded the corporation in order to make illegal payments to politicians who were his friends. 12 Since the lobbyist could have been acting "also, with an intent (however befuddled) to further the interests of his employer," the court upheld charges against the corporation. 13 Though, in the court's opinion, the corporation "look[ed] more like a victim than a perpetrator," it felt its hands were bound to uphold the conviction by prevailing doctrine and a poor exercise of prosecutorial discretion. 14 Even if one is not moved by the particular facts in Sun-Diamond, rogue employees are a pervasive concern. 15 we'll bring it." Drew Harwell, Why General Motors' $900 Million Fine for a Deadly Defect Is Just a Slap on the Wrist, WASH. POST (Sept. 17, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ business/wp/2015/09/17/why-general-motors-900-million-fine-for-a-deadly-defect-is-just-aslap-on-the-wrist/.
6 R. [A] multinational corporation may theoretically be indicted, convicted, and perhaps put out of business based on the alleged criminal activity of a single, low-level, rogue employee who was acting without the knowledge of any executive or director, in violation of well-publicized procedures, practices, and instructions of the company."); Steven D. Feldman, Win-Such scenarios are unavoidable in the current world of massive, dispersed, international corporations, regardless of how robust internal compliance mechanisms may be. 16 Judges and laypeople alike share the palpable sense of inappropriateness at criminally condemning corporations due to the acts of rogue employees, even when the facts are not so sympathetic. 17 Cases such as these undermine the most basic goals of criminal law, and may even have ripple effects that compromise criminal law outside of the corporate context. There is no successor theory of corporate liability poised to take the reins, and nothing satisfactory floating in academic literature. 18 Some proposals, like Peter French's "internal decision structure" model, 19 rest on naïve understandings of how complex corporations actually operate. Others, like the "collective knowledge doctrine" advanced by judges 20 in some jurisdictions, only exacerbate the problems of respondeat superior.
Against this stark background, this Article takes a first step toward a solution by providing a comprehensive theory for adjudicating corporate mental states. Previous scholarship has been limited by the tacit assumption that triers of fact must use fundamentally different procedures for attributing mental states to individuals and corporations. But a substantial and growing body of cognitive science research indicates that people ordinarily use the same psychological mechanisms whether assessing the mental lives of individuals or of groups like corporations. An elegant solution to the problem of corporate mens rea, and the one proposed by this Article people naturally do and build the requirements for mens rea around that understanding. The Article begins by recounting how corporate criminal law ended up in its current predicament, a story intimately bound up with the history of respondeat superior and the evolution of the modern corporation. The Article next motivates the effort to keep a place for corporate mens rea in criminal law, despite how seemingly bizarre the concept may be. It argues that some requirement of corporate mens rea must remain if criminal law is to fulfill its central functions. The Article then raises, only to set aside, alternate theories of corporate mental states.
Turning to its positive argument, the Article asks first whether there really is a unique problem for adjudicating corporate mental states, and concludes that courts face similar problems with the mental states of natural person defendants. Drawing on this key observation, the Article proposes further anthropomorphizing corporations in the eyes of the law, and adjudicating their mental states just as courts do those of natural persons-inference to the best explanation from acts and surrounding circumstances. The resulting theory harmonizes with recent discoveries in cognitive science and social psychology about how people actually assess the blameworthiness of groups like corporations.
This Article proceeds from relatively open-ended starting premises. It makes no assumptions about the "real" nature of corporations or the best theory of corporate actus reus. In the early twentieth century, theorists debated whether corporations are just groups of people or actually constitute distinct entities separate from their members. 21 But, by focusing on how people perceive corporations, rather than on the nature of corporations themselves, this Article sidesteps that debate entirely. Similarly, though this Article assumes that there is some sensible theory of corporate actus reus-a way of resolving when a corporation has done something and what-nothing will turn on the details of that theory. 22 I. THE UNMAKING OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR Corporate criminal law developed its primary theory of liability at a time when corporations looked very different than they do today. Corporations began as limited entities 23 in twelfth-century England. 24 America, the actions they could take were severely restricted, and could never include anything not specified in their corporate charters. 25 In line with longstanding British law, 26 a corporation was not liable for so-called "ultra vires acts" because, being beyond the powers conferred by its corporate charter, the corporation literally could not do them. 27 From Blackstone's time 28 and well into the twentieth century, 29 the very possibility of disembodied and mindless corporate crime left theorists nonplussed. 30 Around the time of the Civil War, American courts began utilizing doctrines of vicarious liability as a legal band-aid for the problem posed by ultra vires acts in the civil context. 31 Specifically, courts introduced the doctrine of respondeat superior, 32 according to which corporations are civilly liable for the acts of their "employees while acting within the scope of their employment." 33 Courts at the time regarded respondeat superior as a matter of "public policy and convenience" rather than a logical consequence of the nature of corporations. The development of vicarious criminal liability was a slower, piecemeal process 35 that progressed by way of analogy to tort law. 36 Corporations were first held liable for failures to act. 37 Later, corporations were charged with affirmative criminal conduct, so long as the offense did not have a mental state element. 38 It was not until the early twentieth century that prosecutors indicted corporations for guilty mental state crimes with any regularity. 39 The delay was no doubt occasioned by concerns such as that voiced by Lord Chancellor Edward Thurlow (1731-1806): "Corporations have neither bodies to be punished, nor souls to be condemned, they therefore do as they like." 40 In recognizing corporate crime, U.S. courts led the charge, 41 adopting respondeat superior for this purpose, more out of convenience than thoughtful reflection 42 (though, perhaps to avoid potential due process concerns with vicarious criminal liability, 43 Corporations have changed dramatically in the two centuries since the introduction of respondeat superior. They were unbound from their restrictive state charters and became the flexible business entities they are today. In 1819, the Supreme Court decided that corporations possessed several private rights, thereby preventing states from arbitrarily rewriting corporate charters to keep them in check. 45 Shortly after, states independently began shedding limitations on corporations to attract business, even allowing them to incorporate without a state charter. 46 Also, the number, size, and complexity of corporations have grown. 47 Before the late eighteenth century, business corporations were rare in the United States; the South had none until 1781. 48 Compare that to the ubiquity of the corporate form in modern America. Until relatively recently, though there were some economic giants like the Dutch East India Company, most business enterprises fit in single-family homes. 49 By the late nineteenth century, only a handful of U.S. corporations had a net worth of over $10 million. 50 But the twentieth century saw the creation of corporations with previously undreamt wealth and complexity. 51 It issued in the developed stock market, complex chains of authority, and the separation between ownership and control. 52 In the early context of small, closely held, and relatively simple corporations, respondeat superior may have served well enough as a rule for determining corporate criminal liability. It did not answer the theoretical question of how mindless entities can commit crimes that require particular mental states, 53 sibility for corporate activity could be traced to single employees or the owners themselves.
Whatever intuitive appeal respondeat superior may have had, its utility is increasingly limited at this stage in corporate history. The modern corporate behemoth operates with such diffused responsibility and decentralized decisionmaking that it is at times impossible to identify which employees approved or acquiesced in illicit conduct, often because no such employee exists. 54 Even where channels of authority and reporting responsibility are well-defined (and they often are not!), each employee's contribution to what amounted to an illicit act may be so compartmental and miniscule that none could have thought or done anything objectionable. 55 In those cases where prosecutors can pin criminal conduct to an individual employee, there is no guarantee that attributing the crime to the corporation will comport with the basic commitments of criminal justice. 56 The employee may, for all respondeat superior cares, be a rogue in an otherwise upstanding corporate citi- tions are ever to be liable for most crimes. 63 As this Article argues, a mechanism that can fulfill this role is available in human social-cognitive architecture and could readily be integrated into criminal procedure. Yet some academics with a more revisionary mindset are not convinced that corporate criminal law is worth the trouble. A few have argued for abandoning traditional corporate crime altogether in favor of purely civil liability or a regime of strict liability. 64 These theorists take as their starting point an anemic view of the purposes served by the criminal law and of the remedies potentially available against corporations. They assume, for example, that "optimal deterrence" 65 is the sole aim of criminal punishment 66 and that "money damages" 67 is the only sanction it can dispense. In doing so, they effectively conceive of the corporate criminal system as a tort regime with procedural inefficiencies 68 and inflexible sanctions. 69 It should come as no surprise that corporate criminal law would make for a poor tort regime.
Ultimately, the question of whether to retain corporate criminal law may be purely academic. Corporate criminal law is growing here and among Western nations, 70 and the political will to reverse this trend is nowhere in sight. 71 Even if academic, the question itself is worth asking. Corporations, after all, are fictitious persons, so there is some choice in whether to treat them as such for purposes of criminal law. comparative review reveals something that may come as a surprise: in other countries, the focus in the past several decades has been on the creation of corporate criminal liability in jurisdictions in which it did not exist, and where such liability already existed the modern reforms included modifications intended to make it easier, rather than harder, to prosecute corporations criminally.").
71 Miriam H. Baer, Choosing Punishment, 92 B.U. L. Rev. 577, 612 (2012) ("[C]orporate punishment is not likely to yield to corporate regulation any time soon. The public has increasingly registered greater moral outrage in response to corporate governance scandals. Moral outrage, in turn, fuels retributive motivations and therefore supports those institutions best poised to take advantage of such motivations.").
corporate criminal law as it stands today has a vital, socially useful role to play that civil or strict liability alone cannot.
A. The Diverse Purposes of Criminal Law
The ends served by criminal law extend beyond deterrence. Other commonly accepted aims include rehabilitation, incapacitation, and desert. 72 As the Model Penal Code's list of purposes attests, 73 deterrence is just part of the story, even for corporations. Were it otherwise, one would expect the scope of traditional corporate criminal law to recede over time, replaced by the efficient strict civil liability standards that deterrence-focused, law-andeconomics theorists often favor. 74 In fact, precisely the opposite is occurring as the breadth of corporate criminal law expands both here and abroad. 75 Desert is the most conspicuously absent aim in analyses favoring purely strict or civil liability regimes. 76 Though desert may "no longer [be] the dominant objective of criminal law," 77 the Supreme Court recognizes it as a legitimate consideration for legislatures passing criminal statutes. 78 Legislatures and courts generally show a default concern for desert by specifying or inferring 79 intent requirements in statutes. 80 Adjudicators also appear to be sensitive to considerations of desert in sentencing corporations. 81 remains a vibrant feature of our criminal law 82 that cannot be sidelined by scholarly fiat.
Desert will strike some as flatly inapplicable to corporations. 83 To an extent, they are right. But desert is an entrenched feature of our corporate criminal law, 84 so there must be some sense to it. It is important to distinguish between two possible desert-sensitive aims. 85 The classic desert theory comes from Immanuel Kant. 86 According to it, in a deep metaphysical sense, justice requires the punishment of wrongdoers. 87 The second approach to desert justifies criminal punishment by its expressive significance. 90 Some scholars speak more broadly about the "expressive function of [all] law," but the values implicated are clearest in the criminal context. 91 According to these expressive theories, 92 criminal punishment "conveys society's authoritative moral condemnation" and "reaffirms its commitment to the values that the wrongdoer's own act denies." 93 Though there has been a recent resurgence of interest in similar theories, they have been around for centuries. 94 Joel Feinberg, in his classic essay on the subject decades ago, observed that " [criminal] [p]unishment is a conventional device for the expression of attitudes of resentment and indignation, and of judgments of disapproval and reprobation." 95 It allows the community on whose behalf the punishment is meted out to disavow the criminal act, reflecting the common sense "idea that in failing to punish wicked acts society endorses them and thus becomes particeps criminis." 96 assumes a certain conception of the wrongdoer . . . ."); see also Corporate Crime, supra note 47, at 1241 ("For an individual defendant, the mental state with which he committed the illegal act determines his moral culpability. But mental state has no meaning when applied to a corporate defendant . . . ."). Expressive theories can apply to defendants that do not have the same moral nature as individual humans. 97 Defendants need only be identifiable entities capable of socially perceptible, purposeful activity. 98 Thus, as É mile Durkheim notes, punishment achieves its expressive purpose not "by virtue of some mystic strength or other," but by "giv [ing] voice to the unanimous aversion that the crime continues to evoke, and this by an official act." 99 No one doubts that corporations are purposeful entities, typically pursuing profit; 100 as discussed later, 101 cognitive scientists now know people naturally perceive corporations in this way. Through criminal punishment, the community can express its stance on conflicts between, for example, profit-seeking and fundamental individual and social rights. 102 When theorists who prefer civil to criminal liability do consider the expressive component of criminal law, they fail to appreciate the uniquely condemnatory (toward the criminal) and affirming (toward the victim) message behind criminal conviction. 103 Placed in the mix among generic con- 97 Friedman, supra note 85, at 845-46 ("Expressive theory accordingly entails a relatively 'thin' conception of the wrongdoer, . . . an identity upon which the community's judgment can be focused in a meaningful way.").
98 See Baer, supra note 72, at 4-5 ("We can credibly blame the financial institution known as 'Goldman Sachs' because we believe, on multiple levels, that Goldman Sachs is an identifiable entity."). Friedman disserves his case for corporate criminal liability when he argues that corporations must also be able to "express attitudes toward particular persons or goods." Friedman, supra note 85, at 845. Purposeful conduct is a lower and sufficient threshold, and one that corporations can much more easily clear.
99 Members of the public show that they feel this way, for example, when they complain that corporations put profits ahead of the interests of workers, consumers, or the environment. Punishing corporations, just like punishing natural persons, is also understood to be the right way for society to repudiate the false valuations that their crimes express. Criminal liability 'sends the message' that people matter more than profits and reaffirms the value of those who were sacrificed to 'corporate greed.'"); id. at 621 ("To the extent that criminal liability more effectively expresses public condemnation than does civil liability, criminal punishments can be expected to be more effective in instilling aversions to crime."). 104 if not change entirely. 105 And in losing the ability to send this message, society would lose something valuable. 106 Even conceding that corporations have what Meir Dan-Cohen calls "practical personality," 107 could criminal law integrate this insight "behind the scenes" without explicitly requiring any kind of corporate mens rea as an element? Such a strict liability approach to corporate crime 108 would also undermine criminal law's expressive aims. Expressions of condemnation target wrongdoing, not just injury. 109 To identify wrongdoing, adjudicators must look behind the fact of injury to the mental states that brought it about. 110 There is all the difference in the world between mistaking someone else's bag for one's own and stealing it, even though the injury caused is identical. 111 available against them are fines. 113 But courts have some latitude in tailoring sanctions to the corporate context, so long as the result is reasonably based on differences between individuals and corporations. 114 Imprisonment aside, many of the punishments available for individual defendants are also available against corporations. The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, for example, explicitly provide for orders of restitution, 115 remedial orders, 116 community service, 117 notice to victims, 118 publicity of the offense, 119 and probation. 120 Courts have also imposed debarment and suspension, and ordered corporations to publish letters of apology. 121 Foreign law presents still other possibilities. In addition to fines, France 122 alone allows for dissolution, 123 bans on professional or social activities, 124 periods of judicial supervision, 125 closure of establishments operated by the corporation, 126 exclusion from the marketplace, 127 and bans on public offering. 128 Italian corporate criminal law adds various forms of "disqualification" to the mix, including prohibition of activity related to the offense, revocation of licenses, and prohibitions on contracting with the govern- ment. 129 The availability of multiple sanctions does not disprove the argument for a purely civil or strict regime of corporate liability, but it does at least show that the argument needs to be much more sophisticated than any currently in the literature.
It is worth noting that some of the most significant penalties that corporate defendants face after conviction are technically not criminal sanctions at all. Collateral civil penalties that follow conviction, such as suspension and debarment, can often impact a corporation far more than criminal fines. 130 Not all available sanctions are socially productive, and these civil collateral consequences may be particularly suspect. 131 The point here is simply that courts' tool chest of corporate sanctions is richer than often supposed.
C. Other Reasons to Make Current Corporate Criminal Law Work
This Article presents no principled objection to developing an entirely novel system of corporate liability. But such a project, even if it adequately fulfills the diverse aims of criminal law, would face significant practical, theoretical, and legal hurdles. To begin, the system would represent a major overhaul of our criminal law. Even if Congress or state legislatures turned their attention to the project, there is no reason to expect there would be consensus on how to go about it. In short, such reform would likely be a long way off. A new theory of corporate mens rea that could be plugged into the current framework of criminal liability would do the trick. allow for strict liability in some cases. 135 But, as argued above, it is doubtful that strict liability rules can fulfill the important expressive purposes of criminal law. 136 Moreover, corporations enjoy many of the same constitutional protections as individuals, 137 including equal protection. 138 Any effort to create a completely separate system of corporate criminal liability with only strict liability offenses may have to contend with some as-yet-unaddressed constitutional hurdles. 139 
III. AVAILABLE ALTERNATIVES TO RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR
This Article is not the first to try to remedy the shortcomings of respondeat superior, 140 and other scholars have proposed alternatives. However, their theories suffer from one or more of the following disqualifying limitations: 141 they apply only to a limited class of mental states, they exacerbate the problems of respondeat superior, and they often presuppose an antecedent, unarticulated theory of corporate mens rea. Understanding the short- The criticisms below reference, but do not detail, arguments about the policy implications of the theories. This is partly because that terrain is already well-trod, but largely because the discussion can turn to policy implications only after a conceptually coherent apparatus for determining mens rea is on the table.
comings of the theories considered below will bring into focus the features a theory of corporate mens rea should have.
A. The Inner Circle
The Model Penal Code offers an approach according to which a corporation is liable when "the commission of the offense was authorized . . . by the board of directors or by a high managerial agent." 142 The driving intuition behind this view, which also reflects the position currently taken by English courts, 143 is that the offensive act must somehow have issued from the "brain" of the corporation. 144 By equating corporate officers with the corporate nerve center, the inner circle approach does not hold a corporation liable for the acts of low-level "rogue" employees and provides a stopper to some of the overbreadth of respondeat superior.
But the inner circle approach only exacerbates the underinclusiveness of respondeat superior. It presumes that those in the inner circle are sufficiently informed about and in control of the operations of the corporation. In today's mega corporation, characterized by diffusion of responsibility and authority, this simply is not true, or possible. 145 Even where there are channels of communication designed to keep the upper echelon informed, these channels can devolve organically, without the direction or reckless disregard of any overseer. 146 Their degradation results from countless decisions by individuals throughout the corporate hierarchy, influenced by factors such as their (mis)understanding of their job responsibilities, good or bad interpersonal relationships, forgetfulness, and a desire to protect themselves (or those above or below them). 147 Because the inner circle are uninformed about and uninvolved in the day-to-day activities of a corporation, where 142 larger any organization becomes, the weaker is the control over its actions exercised by those at the top." (emphasis omitted)). 147 Cf. Commonwealth v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 275 N.E.2d 33, 83 (Mass. 1971) ("'There are not enough seats on the Board of Directors, nor enough offices in a corporation, to permit the corporation engaged in widespread operations to give such a title or office to every person in whom it places the power, authority, and responsibility for decision and action . . . .' In a large corporation, with many numerous and distinct departments, a high ranking corporate officer or agent may have no authority or involvement in a particular sphere of corporate activity, whereas a lower ranking corporate executive might have much broader power in dealing with a matter peculiarly within the scope of his authority. Employees who are in the lower echelon of the corporate hierarchy often exercise more responsibility in the everyday operations of the corporation than the directors or officers.").
criminal action often takes place, corporations will routinely escape liability. 148 While limiting the reach of respondeat superior is surely the whole point of the inner circle approach it was this too well. It offers immunity to corporations that, through neglect or design, manage to keep the upper echelon in the dark about potential misdeeds. That is not the sort of structure the criminal law should incentivize.
B. Collective Knowledge
A minority 149 of courts have adopted the doctrine of collective knowledge as a supplement to respondeat superior. Under this doctrine, a court will attribute to a corporation anything any of its employees knows. If one employee knows A, and another knows B, under the collective knowledge doctrine the corporation knows both A and B. The collective knowledge approach would hold corporations criminally liable even when there is no single employee with a guilty mental state.
In United States v. Bank of New England, 150 a seminal case for the doctrine, 151 the bank was charged with violating the Currency Transaction Reporting Act by failing to report cash transfers in excess of $10,000. 152 Criminal liability attaches only if the violation was willful, i.e., the Bank knew about the reporting requirements and specifically intended to commit the crime. 153 Individual tellers separately cashed checks to the same individual that, when summed, totaled more than $10,000. Other employees of the Bank who were not involved in the transactions knew about the requirements, but not about the transactions. 154 All of the employees were acquitted because none knew both the legal limits and that the transactions exceeded the limits. 155 However, the court upheld the corporation's conviction using collective knowledge. 156 148 See Brickey, supra note 55, at 626 (stating a bit hyperbolically that "a liability rule requiring proof that a high managerial agent ratified a subordinate's misconduct is apt to be, in practice, a rule of no liability at all"). This will especially be the case if, as some critics have suggested, the Model Penal Code will encourage corporations to further insulate the inner circle from the general operation of the corporation. The collective knowledge doctrine certainly addresses some of the limitations of respondeat superior. But it is heavily criticized for doing the job too well, subjecting corporations to liability whenever any employee, no matter how low ranking, knows something suspicious. 157 While these criticisms do have merit, there is also a respect in which the collective knowledge doctrine does not, and cannot, go far enough as a general theory of corporate mens rea. It may operate straightforwardly enough for knowledge-based crimes. Knowledge is generally understood to be justified, true belief. 158 Since all knowledge is true, different things known by different employees can never conflict. The process of aggregating their knowledge to attribute to the corporation is easy-just take the conjunction of all the things known by employees and say the corporation knows it all.
But there are over one hundred mental state terms and combinations in the Federal Criminal Code alone. 159 The process of aggregating mental states quickly becomes complex, if not impossible. Consider crimes where mens rea turns on the beliefs (rather than the knowledge) of the defendant. Beliefs, of course, can be false, as in the classic hornbook case of the wouldbe murderer who shoots a corpse. 160 The limitations of the collective knowledge doctrine become even more intractable for non-epistemic mental states. 161 Consider an easy one-intention. Philosophers of group agency have rejected attempts to aggregate individual intentions in order to decipher group intention. 162 In Bank of New England it is pretty clear that the tellers each intentionally cashed the checks (say, for $5,500), but it is far from clear how to sum these intentions. Did the bank itself intentionally transact over $10,000 for a single client? Or just intentionally transact $5,500 for the same client, twice? The collective knowledge doctrine gives no answer, but guilt or innocence lies in the balance.
Similarly, as with beliefs, intentions can conflict. If a teller intentionally fails to file a report, but his supervisor intends to have all transactions reported, what result? Again, the collective knowledge doctrine gives courts no way to answer. Proponents could adopt some supplemental rule like one guilty intention is enough, or the more specific intention trumps. But such rules go beyond the collective knowledge doctrine, and no one has proposed, let alone attempted to defend, them. This is perhaps because any such rule would not be generally applicable. Whatever rules work for intention may not work for recklessness, or malice, or any of the hundred or so mental states phrases that appear in Title 18.
C. Corporate Ethos
The two theories just discussed, like respondeat superior, are "atomistic," meaning they look to the mental states of individual employees and attribute those to the corporation. The remaining theories are "holistic." They focus instead on corporations as distinct entities to which mental states can be attributed directly (even if only as part of a legal fiction). According to these theories, attending solely to individuals misses the important impact of institutional and ad hoc relationships between them. 163 Proceeding from the observation that sometimes crime is a predictable result of membership in certain organizations, 164 some theorists propose looking to corporate culture as a proxy for corporate intent. 165 can convict a corporation . . . only if it proves that the corporate ethos encouraged agents of the corporation to commit the criminal act." 166 Adjudicators can ascertain a corporation's ethos by looking at its hierarchy, goals and policies, treatment of prior offenses, efforts to educate employees on compliance with the law, and compensation scheme. 167 Unlike the other holistic approaches to corporate liability, corporate ethos has garnered some, however modest, attention from lawmakers. Australia, for example, has adopted a version of this theory, allowing prosecutors to prove intent or recklessness by showing "a corporate culture existed within the body corporate that directed, encouraged, tolerated or led to noncompliance with the relevant provision." 168 The current U.S. Sentencing Guidelines also incorporate elements of the ethos approach in determining sentencing enhancement and mitigation for corporations. 169 Bucy's ethos theory has some of the same limitations as the theories already discussed. By its own terms, it can only be used to determine intent, 170 and is inapplicable to crimes with different mens rea elements. The ethos theory also has some unique defects. Bucy turns to ethos in the search for "a new conceptual paradigm for identifying and proving corporate intent." 173 She thinks that in the context of corporate crime, corporate ethos "translates into intention." 174 But the corporate ethos Bucy defines is a measure of propensity to commit crime (i.e., something like character), not of intent. As Bucy herself argues, the notion of intent, as distinct from character, is fundamental to our system of criminal justice. 175 Indeed, the Federal Rules of Evidence explicitly prohibit the introduction of charac- ter evidence: "Evidence of a person's character or character trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character or trait." 176 This is because perfectly normal people (natural and juridical) sometimes commit crimes for which they should be convicted. 177 And people (natural and juridical) with bad characters sometimes do bad things just by accident, and should not be convicted. Bucy's equation of intention with character muddles these distinctions.
The heart of this last criticism is that corporate ethos is a much better measure of causation than of intent. 178 Bucy's own examples are illustrative. She considers the case of a pharmacy retailer that had errors on reimbursement forms it filed with Medicaid. 179 As a result, Medicaid rejected the forms, and the retailer lost out on reimbursements that were otherwise due to it. The retailer was charged with falsification when two employees, without any direction from higher management, falsified and resubmitted the forms. According to Bucy, the history of defective form filing is evidence of corporate intent. But, while that history is certainly part of the causal chain-without the backlog of denied reimbursements, the employees would have had no opportunity to falsify them-it seems much more indicative of a stupid corporation than a criminal one. In a similar vein, Bucy would take Ford Motor Company's "ambitious production and earnings goals" as evidence of its intent to mislead the government in obtaining an EPA certification. 180 But, while causally relevant, it is not so clear why these goals of the corporation amount to intent rather than competitive drive. For Bucy, the causal story is the end of the story.
D. Corporate Internal Decision Structure
Peter French has pioneered a holistic approach to corporate intent that ties it to the corporation's internal decision structure (CIDS), i.e., the corporation's flowchart and procedural and recognition rules. 181 According to French, the CIDS synthesizes the intentions and acts of individuals within the corporation into genuine corporate intent. 182 "Corporate intent then, is dependent upon relatively transparent policies and plans that have their origins in the socio-psychology of a group of human beings." 183 French's theory has two primary failings. First, it only applies to corporate intent, and as such cannot serve as a general theory of corporate mens rea. Second, it rests on a naïve view of corporate governance in which a crisp flowchart and "transparent policies" necessarily indicate how the corporate machine decides what to do. But, as already indicated, corporations are not always well-oiled machines. Even if a corporation has an official flowchart and written policies, the governance reality of a complex corporation is often much murkier. Chains of responsibility and authority shift organically in response to many factors, including changing interpersonal relationships and individual personalities. Shortcuts are taken, informal policies are adopted in the face of changing circumstances, and water cooler politics is often the real decisional force. Policies, even clear ones, are frequently just rough rules that employees may not even know or remember. As such, they often tell very little about how a corporation really ended up doing what it did.
E. The Reasonable Corporation
William Laufer advances a theory that resembles in some respects the one this Article proposes. He suggests using indirect evidence of corporate mental states by having courts ask: "Would an average corporation, of like size, complexity, functionality, and structure, engaging in an illegal activity X, given circumstances Y, have the state of mind Z?" 184 Laufer's theory certainly represents an advance over those previously considered in that it provides a rubric for any mental state, not just intentions or knowledge. But, like some of the others, it cannot serve as a standalone theory. To apply his test for corporate mens rea, courts must already know what mental states an average corporation would have in various circumstances. And this data point presupposes an antecedent theory of corporate mens rea.
IV. A NEW TAKE
The theory offered below avoids the limitations of the theories discussed above. It is generally applicable to all manner of mental states and any scenario of alleged corporate criminal wrongdoing. Unlike some of the other theories, it does not presuppose any antecedent theory of corporate mens rea because it rests heavily on well-developed theories of mens rea for natural persons. In doing so, it preserves for the corporate context the tight connection between punishment and culpability that is central to criminal law's expressive goals. 185 183 Id. at 152. 184 Laufer, supra note 63, at 701. 185 As such, this Article proposes what Samuel Buell thought was unavailable, a "firstbest rule" for fixing corporate liability. See Buell, supra note 105, at 527 ("Unavailability of a First-Best Rule [:] Unfortunately, under existing technologies of responsibility assessment,
A. Criminal Minds
The evolution of corporate liability reflects an abiding assumption that corporations must be treated differently. 186 The key battleground for the struggle has been corporate mental states. But it is worth considering whether this is not just another one of the "many . . . problems with corporate liability [that] are endemic to U.S. criminal law, rather than unique [to the corporate context]." 187 Ever since American criminal law endorsed the fiction that corporations can have mental states, it has wrangled with the nagging concern that corporations do not really have minds. 188 As a first step, respondeat superior effectively ignored the problem of corporate mens rea through principles of vicarious liability. Next, some lawmakers tried to construct the corporate mind from the mental states of either the managers (the Model Penal Code approach) or all employees (the collective knowledge approach). Still dissatisfied academics have pressed the project further, by proposing more sophisticated models of corporate mentality to run parallel to, but always distinct from, any understanding of the minds of natural persons. As argued above, none of these approaches can work as a general theory of corporate mens rea.
It is time to step back, take stock, and assess the problem free from the inertia of a history that, by all accounts, has proceeded in an unprincipled way. 189 The American legal system is committed to the personhood of corporations. 190 As such, it is also committed to them having mental states. This is there is no optimal means of assessing firm fault. We do not have the slightest concept of how one could judge a firm to have committed a crime in the absence of an agent crime."). 186 See Lederman, supra note 161, at 649 ("This process [of developing standards for corporate liability] is accompanied by a change from using ideas aimed at emphasizing the possible similarities between imposing criminal liability on individuals and the imposition of such responsibility on legal bodies, toward the formation of constructions underlining the unique structure of corporations. Consequently, the issue, in recent years, has moved away from the notion of adapting the imposition of criminal liability on a human being to its imposition on corporate bodies."). This assumption has persisted, even though it is not usually present in criminal statutes. See 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (indicating that "person" includes corporations unless context indicates otherwise). true not only because corporations are liable for crimes, which usually have a mens rea element. Within the fiction of the law, corporations also enter into contracts, buy property, sell goods, and perform all manner of acts implying they have minds. It is hornbook contract law that without "the meeting of the minds of both parties" there can be no contract. 191 Entering into such arrangements is the whole point of creating corporations in the first place. As a result, lawyers and judges are committed to a legal fiction according to which corporate mental states permeate the law. Of course, outside of the courtroom, these individuals can recognize corporations for the mindless entities they are, but within the courtroom, corporations can know things, intend things, be malicious, etc. The problem courts face is not a metaphysical one-do corporations have mental states? The law already tells courts to proceed as though they do. Rather, the problem is an epistemic one-how can adjudicators possibly figure out what those mental states are?
It is over this epistemic question that courtroom fiction and the constraints of the real world collide. If factfinders need to know whether a gun was used in a crime, the prosecutor can bring it into court and show the fingerprints on it. But, even if adjudicators entertain the fiction of corporate mental states in the courtroom, a prosecutor cannot put a corporate mind on display.
The more familiar case of demonstrating what mental state a natural person has may shed light on the problem of ascertaining corporate mental states. Unlike with corporate minds, prosecutors can haul natural minds into the courtroom by summoning the defendant. But, unlike fingerprints on a revolver, finders of fact cannot examine a defendant's mind directly. 192 The most direct access they have is the defendant's self-report, and even that is often mediated by the defendant's self-interest-a very strong incentive to lie, or at least massage the truth.
And yet the criminal justice system for individuals moves on. Courts long ago settled on the only sensible solution to the epistemic problem of determining what mental states a natural defendant has: allow factfinders to infer a defendant's probable mental state from his acts and the circumstances in which he was acting. Thus, in response to a jury verdict challenge, one court wrote: "[T]he surrounding circumstances, the use of a bottle, the absence of warning and the force of the blow are facts from which the jury could reasonably infer the intent to cause permanent disability. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 307(a) (1987) ("The defendant's intention, recklessness, knowledge or belief at the time of the offense for which the defendant is charged may be inferred by the such language is the common response when the epistemic problem is explicitly posed. 194 Judicial opinions recite it so rarely because all involved are familiar with the opacity of other people's minds and the inferences everyone must make to determine what others are thinking. Cognitive scientists now know that humans have innate and socialized neural mechanisms for overcoming the problem in everyday life by just the sorts of inferential reasoning courts allow. 195 And, as argued below, these mechanisms could provide the basis for a theory of corporate mens rea too.
B. The Psychology of Corporate Blame
If criminal law is to satisfy its expressive aims-to satisfy "society's desire to see those [corporations] responsible for misconduct punished" 196 -it should reflect the way people actually attribute responsibility to groups. 197 Cognitive scientists and social psychologists from the last two decades have much to say on the topic. Even though legal scholars recognize the sociological fact that humans believe corporate entities can be responsible for wrongful conduct, 198 they have paid surprisingly little attention to the more recent discoveries in cognitive science. When groups exhibit high levels of coherence, as do most corporations, 199 humans perceive them as possessing many of the attributes traditionally associated with individuals. 200 Cognitive scientists and social psychologists call this property of groups "entitivity" (also known by the tongue-twister "entitativity"), which they define as being "a unified and coherent whole in which members are tightly bound together" by, for example, a collective goal like profit making. 201 The shift in human perception of sufficiently cohesive groups happens at a fundamental level in cognition. 202 Research indicates that the human mind represents such groups as unified entities, rather than as collections of individuals. 203 Once this happens, humans are naturally inclined to make inferences of group-level intentionality behind the groups' actions, 204 rendering "blame and punishment [of] these groups . . . psychologically sensible and sustainable." 205 As some legal scholars have observed, the public "perc[eives] that corporations are 'alive,' and can act, through their agents, in specific ways." 206 People commonly speak of corporations "as 'real' entities in ordinary language and in moral discourse." 207 Recent cognitive science indicates that the practice of blaming groups like corporations closely resembles the practice of blaming individuals. 208 Humans the world over see each other's behavior as situated within an interconnected 209 causal network of intentions, circumstances, beliefs, and desires. 210 Most judgments of intentionality use a quick, spontaneous cognitive system that operates unconsciously, but humans also have a slower, deliberate mechanism that works consciously. 211 Both these mechanisms operate by drawing inferences of intentionality from observed behavior and contextual clues. 212 The same mechanisms are in play when humans ascribe mental states to entitive groups. 213 Experiments show that people ascribe intentionality to group behavior just as readily as they do to other humans. 214 In doing so, people take the same "intentional stance" toward the group as they do toward individuals. 215 Judgments about the mental states motivating behavior underlie the way humans assess culpability. 216 Humans form these judgments about individuals and groups in the same way, and thereby use the same process for deter-mining whether to blame both. 217 To fulfill its expressive aims, criminal law must be responsive to the human impulse to find corporations culpable, and to the means by which humans make their culpability judgments.
Lest entitive groups and intention attribution seem like the exclusive province of cognitive scientists and desert theorists, it bears noting that even those with a minimal, deterrence-oriented conception of corporate criminal law must endorse a similar conceptual framework. Underlying the commonplace thought that sanctions can influence corporate activity are robust assumptions about the causes of corporate behavior. If corporations can be deterred, they must behave as though they have interests or purposes that they pursue rationally and seek to avoid impediments, like fines, that stand in the way. The following is a typical statement reflecting this assumption: "Since corporations are primarily profit-seeking institutions, they choose to violate the law only if it appears profitable." 218 If corporate criminal law is to fulfill its expressive aims, it must exhibit the same sort of sensitivity to circumstance that social practices of judgment and condemnation do. As proposed below, one way to do this is to retain the mediating role mens rea plays between act and conviction. This can be done without any deep commitment to the existence of corporate mental states. But it will require, at a minimum, engaging in a kind of useful pretense where discourse about corporate mental states can help sort between those cases where criminal sanction would be expressively appropriate, and those where it would not. Philosophers call this kind of pretense, and the discourse modeled on it, "fictionalism." 219 Many modern philosophers are fictionalists about all manner of discourse, from math 220 to morality 221 to truth. 222 In the present context, fictionalism would mean that when lawyers and judges talk about something like corporate liability, they may not always aim at the literal truth of the matter. Rather, they may engage in a kind of pretense mandated by Congress and state legislatures, presumably because doing so has some social utility. 223 
C. A Natural Process for Corporate Defendants
Courts are familiar with adjudicating the mental states of invisible minds. The real question is why they have had so much trouble determining what corporations are thinking. It is probably because they have always assumed, even within the fiction of corporate personhood, that corporations need some fundamentally different process. The approach proposed here starts from the opposite premise, that there is no unique problem of assessing corporate mentality. As discussed, scientists now know that humans innately utilize the same cognitive mechanisms whether attributing mental states to individuals or to groups like corporations. 224 In light of these results, the supposed need for separate procedures for individuals and corporations is unmotivated. There is really only one sort of criminal mind before the law. 225 It bears emphasizing once again that the current proposal is not to personify the corporate mind in any metaphysical sense. But analogizing corporations to natural people could be a useful tool for making sense of corporate liability within criminal law, given that it is already committed to a legal fiction of corporate personhood. As Gerhard O.W. Mueller wrote in a different context:
Likening a corporation to a natural person for the purpose of criminal law administration is not [just] an outgrowth of the "psychological tendency toward personification," . . . but is a rational interpretation of the theory of the corporate fiction for purposes of the application of a rational theory of corporate criminal liability. 226 With this premise in place, the present proposal is simple. Courts should ask factfinders to do exactly what they have been asked to do for centuries, and what they do every day in their normal social interactions 227 - The inferential approach shares some features with an approach already codified in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA). 232 With the PSLRA, Congress sought to raise the pleading standard for suits brought pursuant to Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 233 which generally proscribes the use of fraud in the sale of securities. 234 To be liable under Section 10(b), defendants must have acted with a mental state embracing "intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud." 235 Supplementing the standard fraud pleading rules, 236 the PSLRA requires would-be plaintiffs to "state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind." 237 To satisfy this hurdle, the Supreme Court clarified in a suit against a corporate manufacturer that the alleged mental state "must be cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing [mental state] inference." 238 For example, the court must determine that intent to defraud is at least as likely, given the facts alleged, as "mere motive and opportunity" to defraud. 239 So, courts are already in the business of comparing competing inferences about corporate mental states. This Article just proposes expanding, refining, and fleshing out the practice for criminal law. Courts have long expressed readiness to do this, even if they have had, until now, no mechanism available for formalizing the inquiry. 240 
D. Inference in Action
As suggested already, the inferential approach would play out a lot like the approach currently used for adjudicating the mens rea of individual criminal defendants. From the perspective of adjudicators and advocates, their roles would be very similar for both sorts of defendant. Advocates would present evidence of circumstances surrounding the corporate act, emphasizing some, downplaying others, to weave narratives in which their preferred mental state inferences seem most natural. Adjudicators would have the age-old task of weighing the likelihood of these circumstances, the credibility of the narratives, and, treating the corporation as a holistic agent, inferring the mental state they think most likely.
The jury instructions guiding the process could be very similar to those that courts already use. The court should first remind the jury that criminal law engages in a fiction according to which corporations are treated as people. 241 In California, courts have a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury that, " [u] nder the law, a corporation must be treated in the same way as a natural person." 242 Following that, something along the lines of New York's model instructions for intent would work:
The question naturally arises as to how to determine whether or not a defendant had the intent required for the commission of the crime.
To make that determination in this case, you must decide if the required intent can be inferred beyond a reasonable doubt from the proven facts.
In doing so, you may consider the person's conduct and all of the circumstances surrounding that conduct. 243 Some details of the inferential approach-like specifying the allowable rules of inference from acts and circumstances to mental states-are not available, and probably never will be. This is because it is not at all clear as an empirical matter that the inferences humans naturally make, whether to individual or to group mental states, are governed by generalizable rules. 244 Some cognitive scientists think, as a conceptual matter, that there can be no such rules. 245 Fortunately, the law need not specify allowable rules of inference in order for the current proposal to get underway. The cognitive architecture of normal people is already suited to the task, whether or not it is rule-governed in any formal sense. Indeed, factfinders already use it, without explicit rules, when trying individual defendants. To the extent that explicit rules would be helpful, courts are surely up to the task of providing them as the body of jurisprudence applying the inferential approach grows. The commonsense factors that federal prosecutors consult in determining whether to charge a corporation are among the factors that will likely be salient for jurors in determining whether, for example, the corporation intended to commit a crime or whether it was the victim of a rogue employee: the pervasiveness of the wrongdoing within the corporation, involvement of management, history of similar conduct, the effectiveness of any compliance program, timely and voluntary disclosure of the wrongdoing, remedial actions taken, and willingness to cooperate with the investigation. 246 There should be little concern about juries' ability to cognize these and like factors; they are already among the considerations used to sentence corporations. 247 An example will clarify the sort of dynamic the inferential approach envisions. Consider Regina v. Her Majesty's Coroner for East Kent, 248 in which the corporation killed nearly 200 people by setting sail with the bow doors open on one of its passenger ferries. Applying respondeat superior, the court acquitted the corporation of manslaughter charges because, after reviewing the unusually "huge mass of material" 249 about the conduct of the vessel, no individual employee was grossly negligent. 250 If the inferential approach were in effect, the case may very well have shaken out differently. The prosecution would likely emphasize the two-sentence narrative-the defendant launched its ferry with doors open; hundreds died when the ferry sank. Presented with just that narrative, factfinders would likely infer that the corporation was grossly negligent-how else does a corporation that runs ferries launch with bow doors open? The defense could then seek to complicate the narrative, perhaps trying to introduce evidence of the corporation's diligence, in general and leading up to the incident at issue: perhaps the corporation implemented several redundant safety checks, had a strict safety policy, disciplined its workers for policy violations, etc. In light of that competing narrative, factfinders may begin to question the inference that the corporation was grossly negligent-perhaps an act of God was at work instead.
Under the actual facts of the case, the defense would have a difficult time advancing the narrative of diligence since there was ample evidence that the corporation "was infected with the disease of sloppiness." 251 In light of those circumstances-setting sail with bow doors open and a track record of sloppy, unsafe behavior-factfinders could very easily infer that the corporation was grossly negligent in causing the ferry to capsize. The expressive aims of the criminal law were disserved in this case by acquitting the corporation. By opening the possibility of a conviction, the inferential approach is a step in the right direction.
A different result would also be possible in United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California 252 under the inferential approach. Recall that Sun-Diamond was convicted of bribing public officials when its in-house lobbyist defrauded it to funnel money to his politician friends. 253 Under respondeat superior, the court felt its hand was forced since the employee intended to bribe the officials, and could conceivably have the mistaken belief that his employer would benefit thereby. 254 But a court applying the inferential approach would have looked to the surrounding context, notably the lack of actual corporate benefit and the fact that the lobbyist defrauded Sun-Diamond to effectuate the payments. 255 If other factual details supported this narrative, the inferential approach would have allowed the court to infer that Sun-Diamond did not intend to bribe officials. This would vindicate the overall impression that Sun-Diamond "look[ed] more like a victim than a perpetrator." 256 At this point, the unique advantage of the inferential approach should be apparent. Whatever one's view about the use of juries in criminal trials, 257 their central role for corporate defendants is here to stay. 258 That role should emphasize juries' competencies, especially where, as for corporate defendants, jury competence may be particularly suspect. 259 The inferential approach leverages one of juries' distinctive strengths-distinguishing whether, in light of the totality of the circumstances, a guilty mental state is attributable to the defendant. In this role, juries can serve as litmus tests, for corporate as well as individual defendants, of when criminal condemnation furthers society's expressive interests. Respondeat superior and other atomis-tic theories never let the jury assess the expressive appropriateness of convicting corporate defendants; the inquiry starts and ends with individual employees.
E. Limits on the Analogy to Natural Person Defendants
There are limits to the analogy possible between natural person and corporate defendants. This will necessitate some procedural differences in how criminal law treats the two. For example, one obvious disanalogy stems from the mechanisms individuals and corporations have for gathering information about their environment. Humans have five perceptual organs that constantly feed them visual, tactile, auditory, olfactory, and gustatory information about their environment. Factfinders know very well how these sensory systems work and may infer, for example, from the fact that a loud bang happened near a defendant, that he heard it. Corporations obviously lack these.
But creative development of the inferential approach could allow it to accommodate these disanalogies while retaining the core benefits of the view. For example, the difference in perceptual ability between corporations and humans masks a deeper similarity between corporations and humans. Corporations must have some means for gathering information that is important for their survival. Any corporation that lacks them will not be around for long. One way of accommodating this fact would be to allow factfinders to assume corporations know any generally available knowledge that is important to their survival. 260 This, of course, would be in addition to the inferential mechanisms already described, allowing factfinders to infer corporate knowledge from corporate behavior sufficiently responsive to environmental cues.
F. Deterrence and the Inferential Approach
The main selling point of the inferential approach is its harmonization with the expressive aims of criminal law. But the approach should perform well with respect to criminal law's deterrence aims as well. Deterrence theorists will agree that respondeat superior botches that goal, as it does when applied to the two cases with which this Article began. In terms of substitute doctrine, it may be that strict liability would provide the most efficient incentives under conditions of perfect information and where penalties can be optimally tailored to particular corporations. But the analysis breaks down when, as in the vast majority of circumstances, these idealizations are absent.
In the messy real world, the inferential approach should still have robust deterrent effects. This is commonsensical. Few doubt that criminal law for individuals, with its reliance on mens rea, achieves deterrence. The only sensible response to a law that proscribes engaging in some conduct intention-ally is to try to avoid that conduct, not somehow to try to engage in that conduct, just unintentionally. Similarly, if the law penalizes, for example, "willful" misrepresentations (as opposed to all misrepresentations), corporations will be incentivized to avoid making misrepresentations. 261 And corporations will likely strive to comply by implementing the sorts of compliance and response mechanisms that Bucy describes. 262 Corporations accused of crimes could then try to disavow criminal liability by situating their alleged crime in a broader context of good corporate stewardship, arguing that what it did looks, at the entity level, more like an unavoidable accident rather than something done intentionally, recklessly, knowingly, etc. 263 To the extent that criminal law under-penalizes corporations by letting some acts of unwilled misrepresentation go unpunished, civil law mechanisms are still available to pick up the slack (though it is not always clear that the slack should be picked up). 264 Strict liability rules are less concerning in that domain.
Further, there are some unique deterrent advantages to the inferential approach when the criminal law is viewed more holistically. Few in the corporate crime literature consider the effects adjustments to the corporate criminal system could have on criminal law more generally. But, as Paul Robinson has pointed out, our criminal law is an integrated whole, and compromises in one domain can have ripple effects elsewhere. In particular, a criminal legal system that is more responsive to society's perceptions of blameworthiness may foster forces, like respect for and confidence in the law, that ultimately increase compliance by individuals. 265 Conversely, ignoring lay perceptions of blameworthiness in even one area of criminal law, as regimes of respondeat superior or strict liability inevitably do, threatens to undermine the broader effectiveness of the criminal law in preventing crime.
CONCLUSION
The current doctrine for adjudicating corporate mens rea-respondeat superior and its variants-undermines widely recognized aims of criminal law. This Article highlighted the disconnect between the outcomes dictated by respondeat superior and the outcomes consistent with the criminal law's expressive aims. To displace respondeat superior, a new approach to corporate mens rea should have several features: (1) further the aims of criminal law; (2) be conceptually coherent; (3) apply generally to all the mental states that are mens rea elements of crimes; and (4) be easy to implement and administer.
The inferential approach proposed here, uniquely among the available alternatives, meets all four requirements. It begins by recognizing that criminal punishment is a social practice, fulfilling social values that should reflect the human socio-psychological nature motivating it. 266 The inferential approach would have factfinders do exactly what they naturally do already when discerning the mental states of individuals and groups outside of the courtroom-infer likely mental states from acts and circumstances. By treating corporate defendants holistically, the inferential approach would reduce the current administrative burden of assessing corporate mens rea, which requires assessing the mental states of all involved employees. 267 And since it would draw on the process and types of inference already used for trying individual defendants, the inferential approach would be painless to implement and apply generally to all types of mental states. Lastly, the inferential approach furthers the aims of the criminal law better than respondeat superior. Because it uses the cognitive mechanisms by which people naturally assess group responsibility, the inferential approach is particularly apt to fulfill the criminal law's expressive aims.
As a general theory of corporate mental states, the inferential approach has applications outside the criminal context, wherever corporate mental states are at issue. Some of these were mentioned above-for example, tort law with all the mental states that the negligence inquiry implicates, and contract law, which is premised on a meeting of the minds. It may also help illuminate some otherwise puzzling aspects of recent constitutional jurisprudence affecting corporations, such as what sense, if any, there is to make of the notion of a corporation's sincere beliefs. 268 These and related applications of the inferential approach suggest provocative avenues for future research.
